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SACRIFICING QUANTITY FOR QUALITY: BETTER 
FOCUSING PROSECUTORS’ SCARCE 
RESOURCES 
Stephanos Bibas* 
Adam Gershowitz and Laura Killinger rightly explore an important 
problem that prosecutors face: they are spread too thin trying to prosecute 
too many cases.  Their thoughtful, well-written article is an important 
contribution to the field and usefully complements the burgeoning literature 
on the underfunding of criminal defense.  As they argue, prosecutorial 
overwork harms justice in any number of ways.  It delays cases, frustrates 
victims, makes it harder to spot and free innocent defendants, and impedes 
lowering punishments for sympathetic defendants.1 
The root problem, however, is not so much a matter of underfunding of 
prosecutors’ offices as it is a matter of skewed priorities and metrics of 
success.  Prosecutors need not pursue every legally supportable charge.  
They enjoy discretion in deciding which cases to pursue, which charges to 
file, and which pleas to offer and accept.  Though they have that 
discretionary power, too often they do not think strategically about using it.  
Indeed, individual prosecutors often reactively prosecute the cases that 
come before them, instead of proactively setting priorities and focusing on 
system-wide tradeoffs.  Many offices lack hierarchies or office policies that 
meaningfully direct line prosecutors’ efforts.  The problem, evinced by the 
framing of Gershowitz and Killinger’s article, is that prosecutors and the 
public measure prosecutorial success mostly in terms of the number of 
cases filed and convictions won.  Throwing money at this problem would 
only pour fuel on the fire, encouraging prosecutors to widen their nets in the 
inexhaustible sea of potential cases. 
A surer solution is to refocus prosecutors’ efforts to make the best use 
of inevitably limited money.  For instance, as Gershowitz and Killinger 
rightly point out, prosecutors pay too little attention to victims and 
communities, failing to solicit their input and take them seriously.2  We 
must move from worshipping quantity to prizing quality.  Prosecutors need 
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to focus not just on what to do but also how to do it: fairly, respectfully, and 
effectively. 
America’s criminal-justice politics are indeed pathological, as the late 
Bill Stuntz famously argued.3  Legislatures collude with prosecutors to 
create new, broad, and overlapping crimes, which gives prosecutors a menu 
of charging options for a wide array of old and new offenses.  Thus, 
expansive criminal-justice legislation leads to the familiar complaint of 
overcriminalization. 
In a world of overcriminalization, limited budgets are not all bad.  The 
silver lining is that prosecutors cannot possibly pursue all of the new crimes 
that their legislative allies have created.  Resource constraints and scarcity 
can force prosecutors to rank priorities, mitigating in practice the problem 
of overcriminalization on the books.  Limited funds thus are not a bug but a 
design feature: they check prosecutors from prosecuting the entire universe 
of people who are technically guilty of something but do not especially 
deserve conviction and full punishment.  The value of pursuing crimes is a 
declining curve, and at some point the costs of extra enforcement will 
exceed the benefits.  One cannot know a priori what the optimal level of 
funding is—that requires much finer-grained data about what crimes 
prosecutors would pursue if given more money.  It seems plausible that 
budgets are too tight in many places.  But the optimal funding level is much 
less than would be required to try every single alleged crime.  That is 
particularly true because an extra dollar spent on criminal justice is a dollar 
less for other programs.  At some point, criminal justice’s bottomless 
appetite must give way to other needs. 
More generally, overall percentages and statistics alone do not tell the 
full story.  Gershowitz and Killinger repeatedly mention violent crimes, 
correctly implying that some kinds of cases count more than others.4  But 
statistics, even Gershowitz and Killinger’s own statistics, often lump cases 
together.5  Prosecutors rightly feel pressure to prosecute most of the crimes 
listed on the FBI’s index (murder, rape, robbery, burglary, arson, 
aggravated assault, larceny, and auto theft).  But they also pursue a wide 
range of narcotics cases that cause varying degrees of harm.  Street-corner 
and crack-house drug sales, for example, often blight neighborhoods with 
violence and signs of decay, as do the smuggling and distribution that 
precede them.  In contrast, discreet sales may have fewer harmful effects.  
One could draw the same contrast between street-corner prostitution and 
internet escort services.  Yet prosecution and conviction statistics mask 
whether we are using our drug-enforcement dollars wisely, as we would by 
focusing primarily on the former cases but not the latter.  Community input, 
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and not arrest statistics alone, ought to shape these decisions.  Similarly, we 
would not want to live in a police state that inexorably enforced every law 
against speeding, jaywalking, littering, false statements, and the like. 
Even for crimes that manifestly should be prosecuted, much more 
matters than the mere fact of prosecution.  Gershowitz and Killinger rightly 
point out that underfunding not only leads to delays and overcrowding, but 
also impedes sorting the worst defendants for the worst punishment, turning 
over exculpatory evidence, and working with victims.6  Again, all of these 
costs are hidden by quantitative metrics of success.  Gershowitz and 
Killinger begin the process of bringing them to light, but we need a much 
better empirical handle on the severity of these problems. 
The difficulty seems to be a variation on the old joke about the drunk 
who dropped his keys by the front door but looked for them over by the 
lamppost because that is where the light was the best.  Prosecutors and 
voters focus on a handful of quantifiable, objective metrics, such as the 
number of prosecutions and convictions, and imagine each of these cases as 
some hypothetical violent or serious crime.  As Josh Bowers’s response 
points out, however, the more typical and numerous cases are low-level 
misdemeanors, such as quality-of-life offenses.7  Now, prosecutors cannot 
simply stop prosecuting all misdemeanors; these charges help to keep our 
neighborhoods safe, orderly, and clean.  But neither do they need to 
prosecute each one to the hilt simply because there is enough evidence to do 
so.  The charge may be easy to file and the conviction easy to obtain, yet 
prosecutors can lighten their own workloads by proactively differentiating 
within this category of cases.  Is the offender a known recidivist?  Is there a 
better way to stop the public drunkenness, urination, or littering—say, by 
trying Alcoholics Anonymous before jail?  Or, conversely, was this 
offender behaving in a violent or belligerent manner, such that tougher-
than-usual treatment is fitting? 
Gershowitz and Killinger’s article is written from the perspective of 
the overburdened line prosecutor who is up to his eyeballs in cases.  But 
scholars should broaden their field of vision to take in a synoptic 
perspective.  First, supervisory prosecutors matter a great deal, even though 
Gershowitz and Killinger discount their importance because they do not 
carry large caseloads of their own.  Supervisors are in the best position to 
compare office priorities and workloads and to adjust intake, screening, 
deferral, diversion, and dismissal policies to ease workloads.  As Ronald 
Wright and Marc Miller have shown, by carefully screening out weak cases 
at intake, supervisors can reduce the pressure to plea bargain at all costs.8  
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Prosecutorial screening also forces police to prepare by doing better up-
front investigation and sorting of cases before bringing them, which should 
disproportionately protect possibly innocent defendants facing weak 
evidence. 
Second, supervisors should calibrate their policies and priorities to the 
views of their office’s constituencies: namely, the local residents who elect 
district attorneys and need to cooperate with their offices.  The community-
prosecution movement promised to do this, but it has largely failed to 
deliver the goods.  Neighborhood residents can help police and prosecutors 
focus on crimes that cause substantial harm and sow fear, in addition to 
identifying the range of productive responses to them.  The media can better 
publicize the kinds of crimes prosecutors are targeting and the alternative 
programs, such as deferred prosecution, diversion for drug treatment, and 
restitution, that are available for less serious offenses. 
Third, Gershowitz and Killinger are absolutely right to lament how 
excessive caseloads harm victims by speeding up individual cases without 
keeping them abreast and letting them speak their piece.9  As I argue 
elsewhere, victims ought to be much more central to criminal justice, as 
they are most directly injured and thus have concrete stakes in both 
substantive outcomes and procedures.  Having been demeaned by crimes, 
victims deserve more empowerment in criminal justice, which includes 
plenty of notice and opportunities to voice their views.10  Victims do not 
automatically demand the heaviest sentences, and if the system treats them 
respectfully, they may gladly agree to alternative dispositions for more 
minor crimes, instead of traditional prosecutions to the hilt.  Victim input 
can also help prosecutors see the specific injuries inflicted and dangers 
posed by each defendant.  This will discourage prosecutors from lumping 
all defendants together.  Some defendants need to have the book thrown at 
them, and victims can help prosecutors figure out which deserve more 
attention and more punishment. 
Unfortunately, simply throwing money at prosecutors’ offices would 
not effect these changes.  It would instead encourage prosecutors to do 
more of the same, as long as they continue to view their main job as 
maximizing case processing.  Line prosecutors would proceed on auto-pilot, 
prosecuting larger quantities of cases without doing much more to include 
victims and community input.  Instead of trying to squeeze drops of 
efficiency out of the system—doing more with less—we need to rethink 
what we are doing and why.  Our criminal justice system has become a 
plea-bargaining assembly line, and more money will simply speed up the 
machinery.  Conversely, the current financial crisis is an opportunity to 
rethink whether we want to keep paying for ever-longer sentences for ever-
more people, or how well we can differentiate scary, dangerous, violent 
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felons from the many lower-level offenders.  Indeed, we cannot say a priori 
that more prosecution is better prosecution.  Prosecutors should measure 
their success not just in numbers of prosecutions and convictions, but in 
victims’ and communities’ satisfaction and feelings of safety.  Those 
constituencies may rightly demand some quality-of-life enforcement, but 
they can help prosecutors balance the benefits of enforcement against the 
substantial costs of prosecution and imprisonment.  Victims may also be 
satisfied with face-to-face conferences, restitution, and apologies for more 
minor offenses, freeing prosecutors to spend time on more serious cases. 
There are many ways to include victims and communities in 
prosecution.  Face-to-face meetings, as well as eBay-style reputational 
feedback surveys of victims and communities, can appraise past 
performance and encourage prosecutors to ensure satisfaction in the future.  
Line prosecutors could learn how to improve their own performance.  
Supervisory prosecutors could use feedback as part of performance 
evaluations in awarding raises and promotions, counteracting the bean-
counting tendency to focus solely on convictions and docket size.  And the 
media, as well as challengers to incumbent district attorneys, could do a 
better job of making these measures of satisfaction issues in electoral 
campaigns.11 
Although my proposed solutions differ greatly from those offered by 
Gershowitz and Killinger, they address the same problem.  Their article is a 
welcome reminder that criminal justice is about justice, more broadly 
conceived, and in many ways our system slights justice as it speeds cases 
along its assembly line.  Speed kills, or at least it deadens us to the price we 
pay and what is going on along the way.  I applaud their contribution to this 
conversation and hope that policymakers will notice and respond. 
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